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Abstract
This paper presents a new approach to estimating the existence and magnitude of tax-
motivated income shifting within multinational corporations. Existing studies of income
shifting use changes in corporate tax rates as a source of identification. In contrast, this paper
exploits exogenous earnings shocks at the parent firm and investigates how these shocks
propagate across low-tax and high-tax multinational subsidiaries. This approach is
implemented using a large panel of European multinational affiliates over the period 1995-
2005. The central result is that parents’ positive earnings shocks are associated with a
significantly positive increase in pretax profits at low-tax affiliates, relative to the effect on
the pretax profits of high-tax affiliates. The result is robust to controlling for various other
differences between low-tax and high-tax affiliates and for country-pair-year fixed effects.
Additional tests suggest that the estimated effect is attributable primarily to the strategic use
of debt across affiliates. The magnitude of income shifting estimated using this approach is
substantial, but somewhat smaller than that found in the previous literature.
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Brennan, Tim Goodspeed and Alfons Weichenrieder, as well as Mihir Desai, Mike Devereux,
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suggestions. Any remaining errors are, of course, our own.
11) Introduction
In recent years, global economic integration has been associated with increasing
activity by multinational enterprises (MNEs). Over the period 1990-2006, for example, global
foreign direct investment (FDI) by MNEs grew at an annual rate of 12.4%, much faster than
the 5% annual rate of economic growth, and global FDI flows totalled $1.3 trillion in 2006
(UNCTAD, 2007). Thus, the effects of tax systems on MNEs are of growing interest and
importance to scholars and policymakers. Differences across countries in tax rates and
systems create opportunities for tax arbitrage by MNEs, in particular through the strategic
choice of transfer prices for goods and services traded among affiliates and through the
strategic use of debt financing across affiliates.1 Anecdotal and empirical evidence suggests
that MNEs avail themselves of these opportunities to shift profits from high-tax to low-tax
jurisdictions.
In response, policymakers in many countries have sought to limit profit shifting
activities through the introduction of transfer pricing and thin-capitalization rules (e.g.
Buettner et al., 2006). The perceived problem of cross-border income shifting has also given
rise to proposals for more fundamental reforms of the current system of international
corporate taxation. In 2001, the European Commission proposed the abolition of separate
accounting rules for corporate taxation of MNEs within the borders of the European Union
(EU) to be replaced by a system of profit consolidation and formula apportionment
(European Commission, 2001). Avi Yonah and Clausing (2008) also propose a system of
formula apportionment for Federal corporate taxation by the United States. Both these
proposals are motivated by a desire to limit the opportunities for profit shifting that are
believed to exist under current rules.
The empirical identification of the existence and magnitude of tax-motivated profit
shifting is inherently fraught with difficulty. Most existing studies thus pursue an indirect
identification strategy that measures the impact of variations in corporate tax rates on the
profitability of multinational subsidiaries (e.g. Grubert and Mutti, 1991; Hines and Rice,
1994; Huizinga and Laeven, 2008). A small number of papers pursue more direct approaches
that examine the effect of corporate tax rate changes on specific profit shifting channels, in
1 In particular, MNEs have an incentive to charge relatively low prices for goods and services transferred from
high-tax to low-tax affiliates, and to finance the activities of high-tax affiliates using debt issued by low-tax
affiliates (a practice that is sometimes termed “earnings stripping”). See, for example, Dharmapala (2008) for a
simple discussion of these strategies.
2particular on distortions of transfer prices and the debt-equity structure.2 All of these existing
studies rely on identification through variation in corporate tax rates. While statutory
corporate tax rate changes are likely to be exogenous with respect to firms’ behavior,
interpreting the estimated impact of corporate tax rate changes may not be straightforward for
a number of reasons. Corporate tax rate changes impose a common shock to all firms in a
country, and so may potentially be correlated with unobserved variables that also determine
the profitability, transfer prices, and financing choices of MNEs. In addition, changes in the
corporate tax rate may not only affect the MNE’s incentive to engage in profit shifting, but
may also impact other decision margins. A rise in the corporate tax rate may, for example,
dampen incentives to exert effort and consequently lower corporate profitability.
In the existing literature (e.g. Weichenrieder, 2009), such potential confounding
effects have been addressed by focusing on the tax rate differential between the home country
(the location of the parent firm) and the host country (the location of the affiliate). Because
the tax differential can change due to statutory tax rate changes in either country, this
approach can potentially control for country-year effects (e.g. unobserved effects common to
all MNE affiliates in Slovakia in 1998). However, it has not been possible in previous studies
to control for unobserved country-pair-year effects – e.g. unobserved effects common to all
Slovak affiliates of German parents in 1998. Moreover, statutory tax rate changes tend to be
relatively infrequent and episodic rather than continuous. Given the growing importance for
policy of MNE profit-shifting, it would also be valuable to complement the existing studies,
all of which use identification strategies based on tax rates, with an analysis using a
fundamentally different approach.
This paper develops an alternative approach to analyzing profit shifting behavior
among MNEs. Our identification strategy exploits earnings shocks at the parent firm and
analyzes how these shocks propagate across the affiliates of a multinational group. If MNEs
engage in profit shifting behavior, an exogenous increase in the income of the parent firm
should presumably be partially shifted towards affiliates in low-tax jurisdictions, assuming
that the MNE has arranged its affairs so that some given fraction of the parent’s profits are
shifted. A simple theoretical model developed below shows that, under a very general
2 Swenson (2001), Clausing (2003) and Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) investigate how corporate tax rates
affect the choice of intra-firm transfer prices. While Swenson’s study finds only small effects, Clausing (2003)
and Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) report substantial responses of transfer prices to corporate taxes. Buettner
and Wamser (2007) analyze how tax rate changes affect the corporate debt-equity structure and find significant
although quantitatively small effects that are consistent with the profit shifting hypothesis.
3formulation of the costs of profit shifting, the amount of profit shifted from the (high-tax)
parent firm to low-tax affiliates is larger the higher are the parent’s profits, for a given
difference in the tax rates faced by the parent and the low-tax affiliate.
Of course, there are many reasons other than tax-motivated profit shifting – such as
risk sharing within the MNE, or the operation of internal capital markets – for the
propagation of earnings shocks through a multinational group. These alternative explanations,
however, would (at least to a first approximation) apply to both high-tax and low-tax
affiliates. This suggests an identification strategy that focuses on the shifting of exogenous
earnings shocks at the parent firm to low-tax subsidiaries, relative to the corresponding
shifting of exogenous earnings shocks at the parent firm to high-tax subsidiaries.
The challenge for this approach is of course to isolate a source of exogenous shocks to
the income of the parent firm. We adapt for this purpose an approach developed in a different
context by Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan (2002) and construct an expected earnings
shock variable based on the earnings of firms that operate in the same industry and/or in the
same country as the parent firm.3 This provides a measure of the parents’ exogenous income
before taxes and before profit shifting activities. To construct these earnings shocks, we use a
large European micro dataset (the AMADEUS data from the Bureau van Dijk) which
provides detailed accounting and ownership information on 1.6 million firms within the
countries of the EU. The data is provided in panel format and allows us to link information on
parent firms and their subsidiaries. Importantly, the AMADEUS data is unconsolidated (i.e.
data is reported separately for each affiliate, rather than being consolidated across the entire
MNE). The analysis focuses on the impact on a multinational affiliate’s income of an
exogenous shock to its parent’s income. The sample – which consists of over 21,000
observations on approximately 5400 multinational affiliates over the period 1995-2005 - is
restricted to affiliates that operate in a different industry and country from their parent firms,
so that the earnings shocks experienced by the parents do not directly impact the affiliates.
Our results show strong support for the profit shifting hypothesis. While the effect of
earnings shocks at the parent firm on the income of high-tax affiliates is indistinguishable
from zero, we find a significantly positive impact of earnings shocks at the parent firm on the
3 Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan (2002) use their approach to analyze “tunnelling” – the phenomenon of
individual or family shareholders who control a group of firms shifting income from those firms in which they
own a relatively small stake to those firms in which they own a relatively large stake. This approach has not
previously been used to analyze tax-motivated profit shifting. As discussed in Section 5 below, tunneling is
unlikely to be of much relevance in our sample, which is restricted mostly to affiliates that are wholly-owned by
their parents.
4income of low-tax affiliates (relative to the effect on the income of high-tax affiliates). This
basic result is robust to the use of affiliate, year, industry-year, country-year, and country-
pair-year fixed effects. The result also cannot be attributed to a number of potential
alternative explanations relating to nontax differences between low-tax and high-tax affiliates
(including differences in their industrial composition, differences in the degree of correlation
between the economies of their host countries and those of their parents, and differences in
the strength of the financial system in their host countries). Additional tests suggest that the
estimated effect is attributable primarily to the strategic use of debt across affiliates.
Quantitatively, the estimates suggest that at the margin around 2% of additional parent
earnings are shifted to low-tax subsidiaries. While substantial, this magnitude is somewhat
smaller than that found in the previous literature.
The intuition underlying our approach extends beyond earnings shocks experienced
by the parent firm – a positive earnings shock experienced by any high-tax affiliate should be
associated with income shifting to low-tax affiliates. However, because AMADEUS data is
restricted to European affiliates, it is not possible to construct worldwide earnings shocks to
MNEs. Tests using the available (European) data yield results that are consistent with tax-
motivated income shifting, albeit somewhat weaker than those using only earnings shocks
experienced by parent firms.
Finally, several factors – including the inability to observe accounting data on tax
haven affiliates outside Europe, the inability to observe the income reported to the tax
authorities as distinct from accounting income on firms’ financial statements, and the use of
worldwide tax systems by some countries – create a bias against the paper’s findings, and
suggest that the magnitude of the profit shifting effect may be understated. Thus, our analysis
uses a very different approach from that in the previous literature to find support for the profit
shifting hypothesis, and in particular to find evidence of profit shifting effects that are
substantial in magnitude.
The paper is structured as follows: in Section 2, we present a simple theoretical model
to motivate our analysis. Sections 3 and 4 describe the estimation methodology and the data.
Section 5 presents our results, and Section 6 concludes.
2) A Simple Theoretical Model
In this section, we present a simple theoretical model to motivate our empirical
analysis. Consider a representative MNE that consists of affiliates in countries a and b. These
5affiliates earn (exogenous) pre-tax profits ߨ௜ and face corporate tax rates ݐ௜, where ݅∈ { ,ܽ }ܾ.
Without loss of generality, we assume that country a is the high-tax country (i.e. ݐ௔ > ݐ௕). It
is also assumed that the MNE’s home country has a territorial (or exemption) tax system that
does not seek to tax the MNE’s profits earned abroad.4 The MNE can shift accounting profits
between the two affiliates, for instance by charging a lower transfer price for goods and
services bought by affiliate b from affiliate a, or by creating financial arrangements in which
affiliate a borrows from affiliate b. It is assumed that each country defines taxable income as
being identical to accounting income.5
The fraction of affiliate a’s pre-tax profit that is shifted to the low-tax affiliate b is
denoted by x. As in the previous literature (e.g. Haufler and Schjelderup, 2000), we assume
that profit shifting behavior imposes costs C on the MNE. These costs may be interpreted in a
variety of ways, which are not mutually exclusive. For instance, they may be payments for
accounting or legal services associated with profit shifting. Of course, it is not generally
thought that MNEs engage in egregiously illegal tax evasion. However, they may adopt more
or less aggressive tax positions, in relation for example to the arm’s–length standard used by
many countries for transfer pricing, or to thin-capitalization rules for debt structure. More
aggressive positions would, if challenged by the tax authorities, have a lower probability of
being sustained by courts (or may require more resources to defend successfully). MNEs may
also face negative publicity if their effective tax rates are disseminated by advocacy groups
such as the Tax Justice Network. These considerations suggest that the costs of profit shifting
are likely to depend on the fraction x of the high-tax affiliate’s profits shifted, as well as on
the amount of income shifted (denoted here by ݕ= ݔߨ௔).6 In practice, some of the types of
4 For instance, if a is the residence country of the parent firm, the assumption is that country a only taxes the
domestic profits of affiliate a, and not the profits earned in country b by affiliate b. Some of the countries in the
empirical analysis (such as the UK) used worldwide systems of taxation during the sample period. Under
worldwide taxation, foreign profits are subject to taxation by the home country (in terms of our example,
country a taxes profits earned in country b). A pure form of worldwide taxation would eliminate the incentive to
shift profits. In reality, however, worldwide systems have features – such as the deferral of country a’s tax on
income earned in b until affiliate b pays a dividend to the parent in country a – that result in the persistence of
some incentives for profit shifting, albeit in somewhat attenuated form. Empirically, the inclusion of firms from
worldwide countries in our analysis creates a bias against finding a profit shifting effect, as discussed in Section
5.
5 That is, both a and b are assumed to be “one-book” countries with systems of book-tax conformity. The
possibility that the definitions of financial and taxable income may diverge, as occurs in “two-book” countries,
creates a bias against the paper’s empirical findings, as discussed in Section 5.
6 For example, thin capitalization rules may typically be formulated to require that interest payments are below
some fraction of income, or to restrict deductibility of interest when debt exceeds some fraction of assets (e.g.
Buettner et al., 2006)
6costs noted above may be tax-deductible, while others are not. For simplicity, it is assumed
here that C is non-deductible.7
In the light of the discussion above, we assume that the cost of profit shifting C =
C (ݔ,ݕ) = C(ݔ,ݔߨ௔) is strictly positive, increasing in each argument, and convex in each
argument:
Assumption 1: ܥ(. , . ) > 0,ܥ௫(. , . ) > 0,ܥ௬(. , . ) > 0,ܥ௫௫(. , . ) > 0,ܥ௬௬(. , . ) > 0
The MNE’s worldwide after-tax profits (denoted by ) can be expressed as:
Π = (1 − ݐ௔)(1 − ݔ)ߨ௔ + (1 − ݐ௕)(ߨ௕ + ݔߨ௔) − ܥ(ݔ,ݔߨ௔) (1)
or equivalently as:
Π = (1 − ݐ௔)ቀ1 − ௬గೌቁߨ௔ + (1 − ݐ௕)(ߨ௕ + ݕ) − ܥቀ௬గೌ ,ݕቁ (2)
The MNE chooses x (or equivalently y) to maximize . Using Equation (1), the FOC with
respect to x is:(ݐ௔ − ݐ௕) ߨ௔ − డ஼డ௫ − డ஼డ௬ߨ௔ = 0 (3)
Equivalently, using Equation (2), the FOC with respect to y is:(ݐ௔ − ݐ௕)  − డ஼డ௫ ଵగೌ − డ஼డ௬ = 0 (4)
The comparative statics of this problem imply that the optimal fraction x and the amount of
profit shifted (y) are both increasing in the tax differential between countries a and b:
డమஈ
డ௫డ(௧ೌ ି௧್ ) = ߨ௔ > 0 and డమஈడ௬డ(௧ೌ ି௧್ ) = 1 > 0 (5)
Intuitively, if the tax rate differential between countries a and b increases, the marginal gain
from shifting one unit of profit between the affiliates rises and consequently it becomes more
attractive to shift profit from the high-tax to the low-tax firm. This is the basic insight
underlying the existing literature on income shifting (using tax rate differentials as the source
of identification).
The result described above regarding tax rate differentials also holds in a simpler
model in which the cost function depends only on the amount of income shifted (i.e. C =
C (ݕ)). The more general formulation used here (where C = C (ݔ,ݕ)) also yields results on
how income-shifting responds to changes in affiliate a’s pre-tax profit ߨ௔. The optimal
fraction x is increasing ߨ௔ if the following expression:
7 The results are not fundamentally affected if the costs are deductible. However, deductibility adds considerable
complexity, as it is not entirely obvious in which country the costs would be incurred, and there would be an
incentive to shift these deductions from country b to country a.
7డమஈ
డ௫డగೌ
= (ݐ௔ − ݐ௕) − డ஼డ௬ (6)
is positive – i.e. if the derivative of the cost of profit shifting with respect to the amount of
profit shifted (evaluated at the optimal choice) is sufficiently small in relation to the tax
differential between the affiliates. When this condition is satisfied, it is optimal for the MNE
to shift a larger fraction of affiliate a’s profit to the low-tax affiliate in b when ߨ௔ increases.
This condition, however, is not necessary to derive the result that the amount of profit shifted
(ݕ= ݔߨ௔) is increasing in affiliate a’s pre-tax profit:
డమஈ
డ௬డగೌ
= డ஼
డ௫
ଵ
గೌమ
> 0 (7)
As the optimal choice of ݕ= ݔߨ௔ increases in ߨ௔, even in circumstances in which x falls, it
follows that affiliate b’s profit before taxes and after income shifting (i.e. ߨ௕ + ݔߨ௔)
increases with exogenous increases in ߨ௔.
This last result suggests a new empirical test for income shifting. The results above on
the effects of earnings shocks in country a on the pre-tax profit declared by the affiliate in
country b are derived under the assumption that the tax rate in country b is lower than the tax
rate in country a. On the other hand, if country b’s tax rate is higher, earnings shocks at the
affiliate in country a should have no effect on the pre-tax profit reported in country b. This
asymmetry implies an identification strategy for our empirical analysis. As profit shifting
activities are predicted to show up through a positive effect of earnings shocks on the pre-tax
profit level of foreign subsidiaries in low-tax countries only, foreign subsidiaries in high-tax
countries can be used as a control group that captures other potential linkages between the
pre-tax profits of affiliates in the same multinational group. This approach is described in
more detail in the following section.
3) Empirical Strategy and Specification
In the previous section, it was argued that the hypothesis of tax-motivated corporate
profit shifting implies that parents’ earnings shocks exert a positive impact on profit shifting
to subsidiaries with a lower corporate tax rate than the parent firm, relative to the impact on
profit shifting to subsidiaries with a similar or higher corporate tax rate than the parent firm.
Thus, identifying profit shifting activities involves computing earnings shocks to the
multinational parent firm and tracking their propagation among foreign subsidiaries within
the same multinational group. Specifically, we expect a positive effect of earnings shocks at
the parent firm on the pre-tax profitability of the treatment group (subsidiaries in low-tax
8countries) compared to the control group (subsidiaries in high-tax countries). Formally, this
difference-in-difference approach is captured by the following regression model:
ittiitititititit xda   43210 )~log(~logloglog (8)
where the dependent variable is the log of the balance sheet item “profit before taxation”.
Following the previous literature, we use the log of profits, as the distribution of this variable
is highly skewed.
In the baseline analysis, we follow earlier research (e.g. Huizinga and Laeven, 2008)
and limit the sample to affiliates with positive pre-tax profits, for which profit-shifting
incentives are most likely to be relevant. However, when tax systems allow loss
carryforwards and carrybacks, incentives for profit shifting may persist even when the
affiliate’s income is negative. For instance, suppose that every country’s tax system allows
full loss offsets. Then, the MNE would find it advantageous to shift income to a loss-making
low-tax affiliate (relative to a loss-making high-tax affiliate).8 On the other hand, if tax
systems allow no loss offsets, then there will be no differential incentive to shift income to a
loss-making low-tax affiliate, relative to a loss-making high-tax affiliate – both affiliates will
in effect face a zero tax rate. In reality, tax systems fall somewhere between these extremes:
some incentive to shift income to low-tax affiliates may persist, but is likely to be attenuated
because of the limitations on loss offsets in most tax systems. Nonetheless, to address the
concern that information may be lost by excluding loss-making observations, a robustness
check adds these observations to the sample. This uses a simple modification of Equation (8)
in which the dependent variable is log(ߨ௜௧+ ܭ), where K is a constant chosen such that
ߨ௜௧+ ܭ > 0 for 99% of observations (including those with negative ߨ௜௧). As described in
Section 5, the results are similar to the baseline results, but somewhat weaker.
The explanatory variable of central interest ߨ෤௜௧ measures the parent firm’s profits
before taxes and before shifting activities. The parent’s observed pre-tax profit is potentially
affected by profit shifting activity, so it is necessary to construct a proxy for “pre-shifting”
profits. To do this, we follow the approach developed in a different context by Bertrand,
Mehta and Mullainathan (2002). They construct a measure of firms’ expected profits before
“tunnelling” activity (the practice of individual or family shareholders who control a group of
8 For example, imagine a MNE consisting of a parent facing a 35% tax rate, a high-tax affiliate facing a 45% tax
rate, and a low-tax affiliate facing a 10% tax rate. If both affiliates have negative income, shifting $1 from the
parent to the low-tax affiliate will result in a reduction of $0.10 in the loss offset paid by the low-tax
government, whereas shifting $1 from the parent to the high-tax affiliate will result in a reduction of $0.45 in the
loss offset paid by the high-tax government. Thus, with full loss offsets, the incentive to shift income
differentially to the low-tax affiliate will exist even when affiliates have negative income.
9firms and shift income from those firms in which they own a relatively small stake to those
firms in which they own a relatively large stake). Although tunnelling within business groups
and tax-motivated profit shifting among MNEs are very different phenomena, it is possible to
adapt their approach to construct a measure of expected earnings (prior to any shifting
activity) for the parent firm. Specifically, this involves determining the pre-tax profitability of
comparable firms which operate in the same 4-digit industry and/or in the same country. The
construction of this variable is described in more detail in the next section.
In the presence of multinational profit shifting activities, this earnings shock at the
parent level is expected to exert an asymmetric effect on subsidiaries with a lower and higher
corporate tax rate than the parent firm. We thus define a dummy variable ௜݀௧ which takes on
the value 1 if the subsidiary faces a lower corporate tax rate than the parent firm, and the
value 0 otherwise. The results in the previous section imply that we expect a positive
coefficient estimate ߙଷ for the interaction of this dummy variable with the parent’s expected
profit. The sign of the coefficient estimate of the parent’s expected profit ߙଶ is a priori
undetermined and depends on other potential (e.g. technological and financial) linkages
between parent and subsidiary profitability. If, for example, technological advances at the
parent firm enhance the profitability of the parent’s capital and also positively affect
subsidiary productivity, we expect this coefficient to be positive. However, the sign of ߙଶ
does not affect the main results.
The constructed shock ߨ෤௜௧ may be either positive or negative. A negative shock
implies that the parent is predicted to make a loss in pretax and pre-shifting terms. If tax
systems allow full loss offsets, then the incentive to shift income from the parent to a low-tax
affiliate will persist even for a loss-making parent. On the other hand, if tax systems allow no
loss offsets, then a loss-making parent in effect faces a zero tax rate, and so will typically
have no incentive to shift income out. As noted above, tax systems fall somewhere between
these extremes, and the incentive to shift income to low-tax affiliates is likely to be attenuated
for loss-making parents because of the limitations on loss offsets in most tax systems. Thus,
the baseline analysis excludes observations for which the parent’s constructed shock ߨ෤௜௧ is
negative. However, a robustness check adds these observations to the sample, modifying
Equation (8) so that the shock variable is log(ߨ෤௜௧+ ܭ෩), where ܭ෩ is a constant chosen such
10
that ߨ෤௜௧+ ܭ෩ > 0 for 99% of observations (including those with negative ߨ෤௜௧). As described in
Section 5, the results are similar to the baseline results, but somewhat weaker.9
The specification in Equation (8) also controls for variations in firm size and country
characteristics over time and include total assets ௜ܽ௧ and several host country characteristics
captured by the vector ݔ௜௧ (GDP per capita, population and the host country's corporate tax
rate) in the set of regressors.10 In addition, affiliate fixed effects are included to control for
unobserved time-invariant firm characteristics. A full set of year fixed effects are used to
control for unobserved shocks over time that are common to all firms in our sample. In some
specifications, we augment the model with a full set of industry-year dummies at the two-
digit level using the Nomenclature statistique des activités économiques dans la Communauté
Européenne (NACE) classification, to account for shocks specific to certain industries. We
also run specifications which add a full-set of country-year effects to the model and thus
control for country-specific shocks over time (and hence for any country-specific trends).
Finally, we also run specifications with a full set of country-pair-year effects, where a
country-pair consists of the affiliate’s country and the parent’s country.
Our estimation approach has two main advantages compared to previous papers that
identify profit shifting through changes in the corporate tax rate. First, we identify profit
shifting behavior by exploiting the rich and continuous variation in the parent's earnings
measure rather than relying on infrequent and episodic changes in corporate tax rates.
Additionally, the approach allows us to control for unobserved country-year and country-
pair-year fixed effects, which was not possible in the previous literature due to the perfect
collinearity of these effects with changes in the host country corporate tax rate or the
corporate tax rate differential between home and host countries.
4) Data
Our empirical analysis relies on the commercial database AMADEUS which is
compiled by Bureau van Dijk. The version of the database available to us contains detailed
information on firms’ ownership structure and financial statement data for 1.6 million
9 The basic empirical specification (Equation (8)) uses the constructed shock ߨ෤௜௧ directly as an explanatory
variable in the regression. This follows the approach developed by Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan (2002),
described in more detail in Section 4. An alternative possibility is to use the constructed shock ߨ෤௜௧ as an
instrument for the observed (post-shifting) profit of the parent. This alternative approach yields results that are
very similar to the baseline findings described in Section 5.
10 Using other size controls such as sales or the number of employees yields similar results to those reported
below.
11
national and multinational corporations in 38 European countries from 1995 to 2005, but is
unbalanced in structure. We restrict our sample to countries within the EU-25 (the 25 states
that were members of the EU at the end of our sample period), as these countries are the most
extensively represented in the database. The observational units in our empirical analysis are
subsidiaries of multinational groups that are located within the EU-25. Our criterion for
defining a multinational subsidiary is the existence of a foreign corporate immediate
shareholder (parent) that owns at least a 90% stake in the subsidiary.11 Since our aim is to
investigate the propagation of earnings shocks at the parent firm to (foreign) subsidiaries in
the multinational group, it is necessary to restrict our sample to subsidiaries with a parent that
is also located in an EU-25 country.12
In line with previous studies on multinational profit shifting (e.g. Huizinga and
Laeven, 2008), we restrict our analysis to firms with positive pre-tax profits and with more
than five employees. Our basic sample consists of 21,298 observations on 5,398
multinational subsidiaries over the years 1995 to 2005. Hence, we observe each affiliate for
3.9 years on average. Given all these restrictions, our sample contains firms from all EU-25
countries except Cyprus, Malta and Slovenia. The country statistics are presented in Table 1.
Although our estimation sample consists only of multinational subsidiaries, we use
data on all national and multinational firms contained in AMADEUS to construct the
earnings shock variable for the parent companies in our sample. In total, we employ data on
1.3 million firms for which information on profits and total assets is available. Following
Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan (2002), we calculate the earnings level before taxation and
shifting at the parent firm by constructing a proxy based on the profitability of comparable
firms in the same time period. We follow three alternative assumptions to construct sets of
comparable firms: first, we include all firms which belong to the same 4-digit NACE industry
and which are located within the same country; second, we include all firms within the same
4-digit NACE industry located within the EU-25; third, we account for all firms located in the
same country. In all cases, the parent firm for which the expected profit is being calculated is
itself excluded from the set of comparable firms.
11 Note that the results are robust to including only wholly-owned subsidiaries in the sample.
12 Note in this context that the AMADEUS data has the drawback that information on the ownership structure is
available for the last reported date only which is the year 2005 for most observations in our sample. Thus, in the
context of our panel study, there is some scope for misclassifications of parent-subsidiary connections since the
ownership structure may have changed over the sample period. However, in line with previous studies, this is
not a serious concern since these misclassifications introduce noise to our estimations that will bias our results
towards zero (see e.g. Budd, Konings and Slaughter, 2005).
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Following Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan (2002), we determine the total asset
weighted average profitability of all firms in these groups (apart from the parent firm under
consideration) where the profitability of firm j at time t is represented by ݌௝௧ and is defined
as pre-tax profits over total assets, i.e. ݌௝௧ = ߨ௝௧/ ௝ܽ௧. For each year t , subsidiary i ’s parent
firm is assumed to experience a pre-tax and pre-shifting profitability ݌෤௜ as measured by the
total-asset-weighted average pre-tax profitability of comparable firms j , given by:



j
j
j j
j
i pa
a
p~ , ji  . (9)
In line with the analysis of Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan (2002), we only include
subsidiary-year combinations in our sample if we observe at least 10 comparable firms for the
calculation of the parent earning level ݌෤௜௧ in Equation (9).
13 Moreover, with respect to the
second definition of comparable firms (i.e. firms within the same 4-digit industry in the EU-
25), only subsidiaries are included in the sample which operate in a different 4-digit NACE
industry than their parent company to avoid obvious endogeneity problems.14 To determine a
predicted value for the pre-tax profit at the parent firm level, we again follow Bertrand,
Mehta and Mullainathan (2002) and calculate the parent's pre-tax and pre-shifting profit ߨ෤௜௧
as the product of its predicted profitability ݌෤௜௧ and its total asset stock ෤ܽ௜௧, i.e. ߨ෤௜௧ = ݌෤௜௧∗ ෤ܽ௜௧.
Table 2 reports the sample statistics for the parent firms’ predicted profitability
measures. As discussed above, the sample is restricted to subsidiaries with parent firms that
earn a positive predicted pre-tax and pre-shifting profit. To address outliers, we drop
profitability rates in the upper 1% of the distribution. As presented in Table 2, the ratio of the
parent firms’ average constructed pre-tax and pre-shifting profit to total assets is in the range
of 4% to 5% (depending on the set of comparable firms used) but exhibits strong variation
across observations.15 Multiplying by the parent’s total assets stock gives the parents’
13 The restriction is binding in a number of cases for the first definition of comparable firms which comprises
firms in the same 4-digit industry and in the same country.
14 To keep the information set as large as possible, we include multinational affiliates in the calculation of ݌෤௜.
This may raise concerns since multinational affiliates’ pre-tax profitability might itself be distorted by profit
shifting behaviour. As a robustness check, we thus re-estimate the regressions calculating parent profitability
shocks on the basis of national firms only (see Section 5).
15 Note that the sample size differs across the three scenarios as firms are only included in the regression sample
if firstly, the average profitability of comparable firms is positive (which may differ across scenarios) and
secondly, the constructed profitability measure does not belong to the scenario specific group of outliers in the
upper percentile of the distribution which are dropped from the analysis. Moreover, as the industry classification
is missing for some firms in the data, the sample size is smaller in the scenarios which construct the profitability
shocks based on firms in the same industry and/or country. In robustness checks, we ran the regressions on the
sub-sample of firms which are included in the analysis of all three scenarios and find comparable results to the
ones reported in the following section.
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predicted pre-shifting profits, with sample averages varying from $150 to $220 million
(depending on the construction of the set of comparable firms).
The subsidiaries in our sample are considerably smaller than their parent firms. This
partly reflects the fact that AMADEUS does not consolidate the multinational subsidiary
information at the country level. Hence, the parent firms in our sample tend to have a large
number of wholly owned subsidiaries, on average 23.11 in our European sample countries
and 31.26 subsidiaries worldwide.16 The subsidiaries have, on average, total assets of $115.1
million and earn a pre-tax profit of $7.6 million. Additionally, the data includes information
on the host country’s statutory corporate tax rate, GDP per capita and population size.17 The
average statutory tax rate for the subsidiaries in our sample is 33.2%, varying between 10%
and 57%. In general, parent firms tend to face higher corporate tax rates than do their
subsidiaries (as headquarters tend to be disproportionately located in higher-tax countries).
Consequently, for 60% of the subsidiaries in our sample, the local corporate tax is higher than
that faced by its parent firm.18
5) Results
The estimation results are presented in Tables 3 to 6. These tables use identical sets of
specifications, based on Equation (8) and augmented in various ways as described below.
They differ, however, in the set of comparable firms used to construct parents’ earnings
shocks. All regressions include a full set of subsidiary fixed effects. Heteroscedasticity-robust
standard errors that are clustered at the firm level are shown in brackets below the coefficient
estimates.
Table 3 presents model specifications that use the parent profit measure calculated
based on firms in the same industry and country. Following our argument in Section 3,
Specification (1) regresses the subsidiary’s pre-tax profit on the parent’s pre-tax and pre-
shifting earnings (ߨ෤௜௧) and its interaction term with a dummy variable indicating low-tax
subsidiaries ( ௜݀௧∗ ߨ෤௜௧). We thus use a difference-in-difference approach. Common
correlations between parent and subsidiary earnings are accounted for through the parent
16 Note though that not all the European subsidiaries of our sample parents are included in the data since not all
of them report the necessary separate unconsolidated accounting information.
17 The statutory tax rate data for the EU-25 is taken from the European Commission (2006), while the rates for
affiliates outside the EU are based on data of the tax consultancy firm KPMG (2006). Country data for GDP per
capita and population are obtained from EUROSTAT. The host countries’ average GDP per capita and
population size are $21,599 and 35 million inhabitants, respectively.
18 Note that this ignores any taxes on dividend repatriations imposed by parents’ home countries, in cases where
the home country uses worldwide taxation.
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profit variable ߨ෤௜௧ and the profit shifting (i.e. the treatment) effect is identified by allowing
for a differential impact on the group of subsidiaries with lower local corporate tax rates than
their parents. Specification (1) also controls for a full set of subsidiary fixed effects and the
subsidiary’s total assets.
The coefficient estimate for the parent’s pre-shifting profit (ߨ෤௜௧) is positive,
suggesting that parent earnings tend to exert a positive impact on subsidiaries’ profits (which
may reflect, for example, technological spillover effects within multinational entities).
However, the variable of interest is the interaction term ௜݀௧∗ ߨ෤௜௧. Its coefficient is positive
and statistically significant, suggesting that increases in parent earnings have a systematically
stronger impact on the pre-tax profit reported by subsidiaries with a lower tax rate than the
parent firm, relative to subsidiaries with a higher tax rate than the parent firm. Put differently,
low-tax subsidiaries receive extra profits in the wake of positive earnings shocks at the parent
level, consistent with the income shifting hypothesis. This result is robust to the inclusion of a
full set of year dummies to absorb common shocks to all sample subsidiaries over time
(Specification (2)). While this renders the coefficient estimate for the parent's pre-tax and
pre-shifting profit insignificant, the coefficient estimate for the interaction term remains
positive and statistically significant. In the following discussion, we assess the robustness of
this finding to controlling for additional sources of heterogeneity between high-tax and low-
tax affiliates.
As discussed earlier, the sample is restricted to affiliates that operate in industries that
are different from those of their parent firms. However, it is possible that low-tax affiliates
may happen to be concentrated in industries with earnings shocks that are more strongly
correlated with those of their parents than are high-tax affiliates. To address this possibility,
Specification (3) adds a full set of two-digit industry-year effects to absorb industry-specific
shocks over time. The basic result is essentially unchanged.
Affiliates are classified as low-tax or high-tax based on the relationship between their
local corporate tax rate and that faced by their parent firm. Thus, it is possible that, for
example, one affiliate in Slovakia is low-tax in relation to its German parent, while another
affiliate in Slovakia is high-tax in relation to its Irish parent. Nonetheless, it remains true that
low-tax affiliates are disproportionately located in countries with low statutory corporate tax
rates. Time-invariant country characteristics are already controlled for through affiliate fixed
effects (which subsume country fixed effects, given that affiliates do not change their
location). However, lower-tax countries may experience country-specific shocks that differ
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from those of the higher-tax countries in which high-tax affiliates tend to be located. One
approach to controlling for these effects is to add a set of time-varying country controls.
Specification (4) adds GDP per capita and population to the model, while Specification (5)
also adds the corporate tax rate. This leaves the qualitative results essentially unchanged.
Nonetheless, finding appropriate control variables for the universe of potential
country-specific shocks in the economic, social and political dimensions is infeasible. Thus,
we add a full set of country-year fixed effects which control for unobserved country-specific
shocks to corporate profitability over time. The results are presented in Specification (6) and
confirm our previous findings: the coefficient estimate for the interaction term between
parent earnings and the low-tax subsidiary dummy remains statistically significant with a
positive sign.
There may, however, still be a concern that the low-tax subsidiaries in our sample
tend to be located in countries whose economies are systematically more strongly correlated
with the host economy of the parent firm than are the host economies of the group’s high-tax
subsidiaries.19 To allow for this possibility, Specification (7) includes a full set of country-
pair-year effects. These country-pair-year effects, which were not feasible in the
specifications used in the prior literature, absorb shocks to the parent country over time and
allow for a heterogeneous transmission of these shocks to the subsidiary economies.20 Again,
the findings are qualitatively unchanged.
Quantitatively, Specification (7) suggests that an increase in the pre-tax and pre-
shifting profits at the parent level by 10% enhances the profit earned at the affiliate by 0.4%.
Evaluated at the sample mean, this implies that an increase in the parent firm’s pre-shifting
profits by $22 million enhances the pre-tax profit reported at the subsidiary level (conditional
on the subsidiary’s assets) by around $30,000. This effect may seem small, but it represents
only the amount of income-shifting to one specific low-tax affiliate. In part because our
analysis does not consolidate the subsidiaries of a given multinational group located within
the same host country, the parent firms in our sample own a considerable number of foreign
19 A variant of this possibility is that the effect may differ across affiliates in Western and Eastern Europe, with
the latter generally facing lower tax rates. However, the results are very similar and remain highly significant
when observations for which either the affiliate or the parent is located in Eastern Europe (specifically, the
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia) are omitted.
20 The country-pair-year effects represent, in essence, a dummy variable for each combination of subsidiary
location and parent home country in a given year – e.g. all affiliates located in Estonia with German parents in
1998 would have a common country-pair-year effect. Of course, country-pair-year effects subsume the country-
year effects used in Specification (6). Note also that the time-varying country-level controls (such as GDP per
capita) are no longer included in Specifications (6) and (7), as they are subsumed by country-year effects and a
fortiori by country-pair-year effects.
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subsidiaries. On average, a parent firm owns 23.11 subsidiaries in our European sample
countries and 31.26 subsidiaries worldwide. As indicated in Table 2, 60% of the subsidiaries
within Europe face a lower corporate tax rate than their parent firm, implying that a parent on
average shifts profits to 13.9 subsidiaries.21 Evaluated at the sample mean, this implies that
around $420,000 is shifted out of the parent country, representing 2% of the pre-shifting
profit shock of $22 million. Assuming that this behaviour can be extrapolated to subsidiaries
outside Europe (for which no financial data is available in AMADEUS), 2.6% of the
additional profits would be shifted towards low-tax affiliates.
This estimate is quantitatively somewhat smaller than those found in the previous
literature, using corporate tax rate changes as a source of identification. Existing studies
typically estimate the semi-elasticity of affiliate pre-tax profits to changes in the tax rate
difference between the affiliate and other firms in the multinational group. The estimates
range from semi-elasticities of around -0.5 to -1.7 (see e.g. Huizinga and Laeven, 2008).
Estimates for profit shifting activities between headquarters and (low-tax) subsidiaries are
around -0.5, i.e. at the lower end of this range (see Dischinger and Riedel, 2010). Replicating
the approach of the previous literature using this sample also results in a semi-elasticity of
around -0.5, which implies that on average around 3.3% of the parents’ pre-shifting profits
are transferred to low-tax subsidiaries.22 This exceeds our estimates of 2% of income being
shifted within Europe and 2.6% worldwide.
As described in Section 4, the set of comparable firms used for the calculation of the
parents’ pre-tax and pre-shifting profit comprises both national and multinational
corporations. Including multinationals in the calculation keeps the information set as large as
possible. On the other hand, multinational corporations’ pre-tax profitability might itself be
distorted by profit shifting behavior.23 As a sensitivity check, we thus construct the pre-tax
21 The fraction of low-tax subsidiaries remains close to 60% if we account for all our parent firms’ subsidiaries
in the EU-25 and worldwide.
22 Replicating the approach of the previous literature involves adding the tax rate differential between the
subsidiary and its parent firm to our regression model (which results in a semi-elasticity of around -0.5),
consistent with the previous literature. Using this identification approach, the fraction of profit shifted from our
sample parents to their low-tax subsidiaries can be approximated by multiplying the semi-elasticity estimate by
the average tax rate differential (7.7% in our sample) between parents and low-tax affiliates (see Huizinga and
Laeven (2008) for an analogous approach). Consequently, the estimate suggests that around 3.3% (= -0.5*7.7%)
of the parents’ pre-shifting profits are transferred to low-tax subsidiaries.
23 Including multinational firms in the calculation of the shock variables may on the one hand lead to an
overestimation of our effect, as e.g. positive profitability shocks in high-tax countries may be underestimated if
multinational firms that are included in the calculation of ݌෤௜ shift a fraction of the enhanced profits out of the
country. On the other hand, the effect may be underestimated if the profitability of multinationals included in the
calculation of ݌෤௜ is affected by changes in profit shifting incentives (e.g. changes in anti-avoidance rules, such as
transfer price documentation requirements). If incentives to shift profits from a high-tax parent country to a low-
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and pre-shifting profit at the parent level using only the profitability of the subgroup of
national firms in the same industry and country. Specification (8) re-estimates Specification
(7) using the parent earnings measure calculated based on national firms only. This exercise
results in coefficient estimates that are very similar to those in Specification (7).24
The baseline specifications employ the affiliate’s pre-tax profit as the dependent
variable. Pretax profit includes both the operating and financial profit of the firm.
Consequently, the estimated effect can be interpreted as capturing potential profit shifting
activities through both transfer price distortions (which affect the affiliate’s operating
income) and through distortions to intra-firm debt (which affect the affiliate’s financial
income). To disentangle the transfer pricing and debt shifting channels, we run specifications
in which we employ the affiliate’s earnings before interest and taxation (EBIT), i.e. its
operating profit, as the dependent variable. The strategic use of debt (in particular, the
payment of interest by high-tax affiliates to low-tax affiliates) would be captured by pretax
profit, but not by EBIT. On the other hand, EBIT would capture transfer pricing
manipulation.
The results of the EBIT regression are presented in Column (9). The coefficient
estimate for the interaction between the parent’s pre-shifting profit and the low-tax subsidiary
dummy is considerably smaller than in Column (8) and is statistically insignificant. This
result is consistent with the profit shifting activity inferred from the baseline estimates
occurring primarily through the use of inter-affiliate debt, rather than through transfer pricing.
This pattern is likely driven by the design of our empirical approach as parents and subsidiary
firms in our data belong to different industries and intra-firm trade across industries and thus
transfer pricing opportunities are likely to be limited. Thus, the finding in Column (9) tends
to reinforce the baseline results, in that the strategic use of debt is a more credible channel for
profit shifting across industries and in response to relatively short-term earnings shocks
experienced by the parent.25
tax subsidiary are reduced, this for example enhances the estimated parent profitability ݌෤௜ but simultaneously
reduces the subsidiary’s profitability and thus biases the effect downwards.
24 Note that the sample size is smaller than in Specification (6). This is due to the fact that several country-
industry groups have fewer than 10 comparable firms if we account for national corporations only and are hence
dropped from the analysis. Moreover, national firms in our data have a higher probability of making losses.
Consequently, the constructed parent firms’ pre-shifting profit estimates are more likely to be negative, causing
them to be excluded from the estimation (see Section 4).
25 This inference is reinforced by examining differences in income shifting for firms with relatively high and
relatively low degrees of R&D intensity. If transfer pricing were an important channel for the baseline income
shifting result, then given the important role of intangible assets in transfer pricing, we would expect that
income shifting would be concentrated among R&D-intensive firms. However, dividing the sample in this way
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The results in Table 3 are based on parent earnings shocks calculated using data on
firms in the same industry and country. To assess the sensitivity of our results to alternative
definitions of the group of comparable firms, Tables 4 and 5 report the same set of
specifications as in Table 3, using alternative measures of parent earnings shocks. Table 4
reports results using parent earnings shocks calculated using data on all firms within the EU-
25 that operate in the same 4-digit industry as the parent under consideration. Table 5 reports
results using parent earnings shocks calculated using data on all firms located within the same
country as the parent under consideration. In both tables, Specifications (1) to (7) and
specification (9) include the parent’s pre-shifting profit constructed based on national and
multinational firms while Specification (8) uses the parent’s pre-shifting profit measure
constructed based on the subsample of national firms only. Moreover, Specifications (1) to
(8) employ the affiliate’s profit before taxation as dependent variable whereas the dependent
variable in Specification (9) is the affiliate’s EBIT. All coefficient estimates for the parent’s
earnings measures and its interaction term turn out to be qualitatively and quantitatively
comparable to our previous results in Table 3, and thus support the hypothesis that
multinational firms engage in quantitatively relevant profit shifting activities to low-tax
subsidiaries.26
As noted earlier, a potential alternative explanation for the propagation of parents’
shocks to their affiliates is the operation of internal capital markets within multinational
entities.27 In particular, it might be the case that low-tax affiliates happen to be located in
countries where it is more difficult or costly to obtain financing locally. Any time-invariant
financing constraints are already captured by affiliate fixed effects, and any changes in
countries’ financial markets over time by the country-year or country-pair-year fixed effects.
The concern, however, is that the low-tax affiliate indicator is capturing the effect of
weakness in the host country’s financial system, rather than tax status. To address this
possibility, we use a measure of the strength of the financial system in the affiliate’s host
country. Following previous papers, we use the ratio of financial system deposits to GDP
(often referred to as “financial depth”) as a proxy for financial development which is obtained
(using average R&D expenditures relative to sales at the industry level) does not yield significant differences in
income shifting between R&D-intensive firms and other firms.
26 More precisely, the estimates suggest slightly larger effects than our baseline specifications, with 2.1% (2.9%)
of additional parent earnings being shifted to low-tax subsidiaries within the EU-25 (worldwide).
27 Dropping financial sector firms, which might be thought to play a greater role in internal capital markets,
leads to results similar to the baseline findings.
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from an updated version of the dataset described in Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2000)
(see also Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2009)).
Specification (1) in Table 6 reestimates our baseline regression in Column (7) of
Table 3 including the interaction between financial system deposits over GDP and the parent
firm’s pre-shifting profit as an additional control variable (note that financial depth per se is
subsumed by the country-pair-year effects). The coefficient estimates for the financial depth
interaction are statistically insignificant. Most importantly, however, the estimation results
confirm our previous findings - earnings shocks at the parent firm exert a significantly larger
positive effect on the pre-tax profits of affiliates in low-tax countries relative to high-tax
locations, even when controlling for the possibility of a differential effect with respect to
financial depth. The basic result in Column (7) of Table (3) is also robust to excluding
affiliates in countries with weakly developed financial markets from the sample (see
Specifications (2) and (3)).28
Our baseline specification relies only on profit shocks to the parent firm. However,
the intuition underlying our empirical strategy extends beyond this, and potentially applies to
profit shocks at any other group affiliate. Unfortunately, it is not possible to compute group-
wide profit shocks, as the AMADEUS database only reports accounting information for
European affiliates, even though many of the multinational entities in the sample own
affiliates outside Europe (AMADEUS records the existence of non-European affiliates, but
not any detailed information about them). Exploiting the available information, we construct
two pre-shifting profit variables pertaining to affiliate i: first, the sum of the pre-shifting pre-
tax profits at all group affiliates within the EU-25 that face a higher corporate tax rate than
affiliate i (including the parent if it satisfies this criterion) and second, the sum of the pre-
shifting pre-tax profits at all group affiliates within the EU-25 that face a lower corporate tax
rate than affiliate i (including the parent if it satisfies this criterion).29 In Specification (4)
(Specification (5)) of Table 6, we regress the subsidiary’s pre-tax profit on the former (latter)
variable.
28 Specification (2) excludes affiliates in host countries with a ratio of financial system deposits to GDP smaller
than 0.5 (Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Sweden). Specification (3) also excludes
affiliates in host countries with a ratio of financial system deposits to GDP smaller than 0.65 (which corresponds
to the mean of our sample countries). The additional excluded countries are the Czech Republic, Denmark,
France, Greece, Italy, and the Slovak Republic. Note also that the sample size for the regressions including the
financial depth variable is slightly smaller than in the baseline regression as the information on financial system
deposits over GDP is missing for some sample years.
29 To ensure that our results are not driven by changes in the composition of firms that are used for the
calculation of the shock variables, the construction uses only those firms for which we observe information on
the pre-shifting profits for the whole sample period.
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We find that profit shocks to affiliates with a higher corporate tax rate than affiliate i
have a positive and statistically significant impact on subsidiary i’s profits, while profit
shocks to affiliates with a lower corporate tax rate have an effect that is smaller and
statistically indistinguishable from zero. This is consistent with the baseline results, although
the statistical significance is somewhat weaker. These findings should be interpreted with
some caution. The lack of data for non-European affiliates introduces measurement error in
the shock variables, biasing our coefficient estimates towards zero under the assumption that
this error is random. It may also cause other systematic biases if non-European affiliates have
systematically different characteristics than European subsidiaries. However, the fact that
these results are in the expected direction is at least somewhat reassuring.
As AMADEUS does not report accounting information for non-European affiliates,
our analysis does not account for profit shifting to zero-tax non-European havens.30 Applying
the tax haven definition in Dharmapala and Hines (2009)31 and using the information in
AMADEUS on the location of non-European affiliates, 58% of the affiliates in our sample
belong to multinational entities that include at least one affiliate in a non-European tax haven.
For these affiliates’ multinational groups, income shifting to non-European havens may serve
as a substitute for income shifting to low-tax European countries. This would imply that low-
tax European affiliates in this subsample might be expected to experience a smaller effect of
parent earnings shocks. On the other hand, it is possible that multinational entities with more
profit-shifting opportunities are more likely to establish affiliates in non-European havens.32
Then, it is possible that low-tax European affiliates in this subsample may experience a larger
effect of parent earnings shocks. In either case, however, the measured effect in our analysis
would seem to be understated relative to the effect that would be obtained with accounting
data on non-European haven affiliates.
The available evidence suggests the latter interpretation – i.e. that multinational
entities with more profit-shifting opportunities are more likely to establish affiliates in non-
European havens. The effect of parent earnings shocks on the income of low-tax affiliates
30 On the other hand, as there is no accounting data for high-tax non-European affiliates, it is theoretically
possible that there is a very large positive impact of shocks to parent earnings on the income of high-tax non-
European affiliates that would potentially weaken our result. Unfortunately, there is no way to completely rule
out this possibility using this dataset. However, there is no reason to believe that the impact of parents’ earnings
shocks on high-tax non-European affiliates would be so dramatically different from the essentially zero effect on
high-tax European affiliates.
31 This is based on the list of tax havens in Hines and Rice (1994). Results are similar using an alternative list of
tax havens constructed by the OECD (and also reported in Dharmapala and Hines (2009)).
32 Desai, Foley and Hines (2006) find that U.S. multinationals that are larger in size, have more opportunities for
trade within the MNE, and higher R&D intensity are more likely to have tax haven affiliates.
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(relative to the effect on high-tax affiliates) is larger and statistically significant in the
subsample of affiliates belonging to multinational entities that include at least one affiliate in
a non-European tax haven. This effect is smaller and not statistically significant in the
subsample of affiliates belonging to multinational entities that include no affiliates in non-
European tax havens. This suggests that the effect we find in the full sample is concentrated
among the former subsample. However, this does not undermine the basic result, as there
would presumably be even more income-shifting that would be observed among this
subsample if data on non-European haven affiliates were observed.33
There are a number of other considerations that also tend to create a bias against our
findings. Our analysis relies on financial profit information (i.e. book income), which may
deviate from the corporate profits reported for tax purposes (although financial and tax
accounts are in general more closely linked in Europe than in other countries like the U.S.,
see e.g. Freedman, 2008). Book-tax differences may be caused by differences in the
accounting rules governing the reporting of income for book and tax purposes, as well as by
tax planning activities (e.g. Desai and Dharmapala, 2006). To the extent that book and tax
income diverge, the main implication for our analysis is that the parent may shift tax income
(but not book income) to low-tax affiliates. This would tend to bias the profit shifting
estimate downwards. To confound our results, the parent would have to be assumed to shift
book income (but not tax income) to low-tax affiliates. It is unlikely that the parent would
have any incentive to do this. Moreover, any changes in the accounting rules or practices that
would affect book-tax differences in either the parent’s home country or the affiliate’s
country would be absorbed by the country-pair-year fixed effects.
In addition, our sample includes a set of parent home countries that employ
worldwide taxation systems under which subsidiary income is subject to taxation in the
parent country. For multinational entities headquartered in such countries, profit shifting
incentives are accordingly diminished (see our discussion in Section 2). This would also
create a bias against our finding, as parents in countries with worldwide taxation would be
less likely to shift income to low-tax affiliates. Moreover, changes in parent country tax rates
and rules would be absorbed by the country-pair-year fixed effects.
As discussed previously, the baseline regressions all exclude observations for which
the affiliate’s income is negative and those for which the parent’s constructed profit shock is
33 Note that the lowest tax rate in our sample is 10%, whereas many non-European havens have a zero tax rate.
Thus, the incentives to shift income to such havens would presumably be stronger than the incentives to shift
income to low-tax European countries in our sample.
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negative. This reflects the likelihood that income shifting incentives would be attenuated in
the presence of losses, because of the limitations on loss offsets in most tax systems. It is
possible, however, that there may be some loss of information associated with excluding
these observations. Thus, as foreshadowed in Section 3, we conduct a robustness check that
involves retaining these observations in the estimating sample, with the log specification in
Equation (8) modified as described in Section 3. The results are quite similar to the baseline
results in Tables 3-5. However, they are somewhat weaker in terms of significance, with the
coefficient on the interaction term of interest being only of borderline statistical significance.
This finding is consistent with the idea that limitations on loss offsets lead to attenuated
income shifting incentives in the presence of losses.
Finally, it is unlikely that the estimated effect can be explained by the types of
tunnelling activities analyzed in Bertrand, Mehta and Mullainathan (2002). The affiliates in
our sample are held by their parents with at least a 90% ownership stake. The results,
moreover, are robust to restricting the sample purely to those affiliates that are 100% owned
by the parent. As long as 100% of the cash-flow rights associated with stock in the subsidiary
are held by the parent, the parent’s controlling shareholder (if one exists) has no incentive to
tunnel income from the affiliate to the parent firm (or vice versa). The only scenario in which
tunnelling might potentially confound the results is when affiliates issue dual-class stock,
with the parent owning 100% of the voting stock but significantly less of the cash-flow rights,
and where the parent owns a larger share of the cash-flow rights at low-tax affiliates than at
high-tax affiliates. AMADEUS does not report information about dual-class stock, but the
scenario sketched above seems an unlikely one. For example, Faccio and Lang (2002) trace
the ownership patterns of a large set of European corporations, and find that divergence
between cash-flow rights and voting rights is of importance in only a few of their sample
countries. Moreover, such devices may be thought to be particularly unlikely among
multinational entities.
6) Conclusion
Multinational profit shifting activities are perceived to be a major threat to the tax
base of high-tax economies around the world. However, empirically testing for profit shifting
behavior is inherently difficult as it requires a way to isolate tax motivations. Existing studies
employ indirect identification approaches that analyze shifting behaviour by estimating firm
responses (adjustments in reported pre-tax profitability, intra-firm transfer prices or debt-
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equity structure) to changes in the corporate tax rate or the difference in tax rates between
home and host countries. Identification is thus based on rather infrequent changes in statutory
corporate tax rates, which are difficult to differentiate from contemporaneous changes in the
home and/or host country’s political, social or economic environment. Moreover, tax changes
may affect other determinants of profitability such as management effort, potentially
confounding the estimates of income-shifting.
Our paper develops a new identification approach based on the idea that in the
presence of profit shifting, exogenous earnings shocks to a multinational parent firm would
be expected to propagate differently to foreign subsidiaries in high-tax and low-tax countries.
Specifically, if a multinational group engages in corporate profit shifting activities in order to
reduce its corporate tax burden, it would be expected to transfer a fraction of the additional
parent earnings to its low-tax subsidiaries only. This allows us to use the multinational’s
high-tax affiliates as a control group to absorb other (technological or financial) channels
through which parent earnings may affect subsidiary profitability. As pre-shifting earnings
change frequently and continuously, our identification strategy uses a rich source of variation,
and also allows us to control for country-specific and country-pair-specific time effects of
arbitrary form.
This identification approach is implemented using a large and comprehensive panel
data set on European firms. We construct exogenous earnings shocks to multinational parent
corporations by exploiting annual profitability information on a large set of comparable firms
operating in the same four-digit industry and/or the same country as the parent. Our
regression results indicate that these exogenous changes in parent earnings exert a
significantly positive effect on the profitability of low-tax subsidiaries, relative to the effect
on the profitability of high-tax subsidiaries. This result is robust to controlling for various
sources of nontax heterogeneity across low-tax and high-tax affiliates.
The paper’s primary contribution is thus to find support for the hypothesis of tax-
motivated income-shifting, using a very different identification strategy than those used in the
previous literature. This approach thus deepens and enriches the sources of evidence on this
issue. For example, it enables us to rule out the possibility that profit shifting results are
merely an artefact of country-pair-specific time effects. Quantitatively, the estimates suggest
that at the margin around 2% of the (additional) parent profits are transferred to low-tax
subsidiaries. This represents a substantial effect, although it is somewhat smaller than that
found in the previous literature using changes in corporate tax rates as the source of
24
identification. On the other hand, the fact that the estimates are not larger in magnitude also
suggests that existing economic and legal frictions (such as transfer pricing regulations and
thin-capitalization rules) constraining tax planning play an important role.
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Table 1: Country Statistics
Country Subsidiary Country Parent Country
Austria 67 90
Belgium 391 512
Czech Republic 184 1
Denmark 321 461
Estonia 106 5
Finland 259 317
France 645 1263
Germany 241 930
Great Britain 800 166
Greece 51 12
Hungary 86 3
Ireland 98 8
Italy 429 279
Latvia 44 0
Lithuania 25 0
Luxembourg 23 102
Netherlands 265 235
Poland 336 5
Portugal 93 28
Slovakia 35 0
Spain 535 161
Sweden 364 820
Sum 5,398 5,398
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Subsidiary Characteristics
Pre-tax ProfitsF 21, 298 7, 584.8 53, 057.98 1 3, 926, 446
Total AssetsF 21, 298 115, 078.2 571, 304.9 6 5.48e+ 07
GDP per CapitaN 21, 298 21, 598.96 8385.69 1811.24 60, 311.23
Population 21, 298 34, 958.92 24, 534.73 411.60 82, 536.68
Corporate Tax Rate 21, 298 .3322 .0658 0.10 .57
Financial Depth† 20, 154 .6709 .2709 .1031 3.2074
Low Tax Subsidiary 21, 298 .60 0.49 0 1
Parent Characteristics
Total AssetsF 21, 298 4, 052, 612 1.11e+ 07 8 1.61e+ 08
Profitability Shocks
Profitability (p˜it Co-Ind
) 18, 408 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.33
Profitability (p˜it Ind
) 17, 802 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.31
Profitability (p˜it Co
) 21, 298 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.10
Pre-tax and Pre-shifting Profits
Pre-Shifting ProfitsF (piit Co-Ind∗) 18, 408 220, 211.1 1, 003, 638 .22 2.24e+ 07
Pre-Shifting ProfitsF (piit Ind∗) 17, 802 150, 172.3 419, 698.5 0.00 9, 389, 824
Pre-Shifting ProfitsF (piit Co∗) 21, 298 181, 472.6 533, 935 0.20 9, 462, 049
Notes:
F In thousand US dollars, current prices.
N In US dollars, current prices.
 In thousands.
† Financial depth depicts the ratio of financial system deposits to GDP as a proxy for financial
development obtained from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2000) and Beck and Demirguc-Kunt
(2009).
 Profitability p˜it represents the pre-tax and pre-shifting profitability of the parent of a considered
affiliate, which is constructed as the asset weighted average of all firms in the same 4-digit NACE
industry and the same country (“Co-Ind”), the same 4-digit NACE industry(“Ind”) and the same
country(“Co”) respectively.
∗ Profitability piit represents the pre-tax and pre-shifting profit of the parent of a considered affiliate,
which is constructed as the product of the asset weighted average profitability p˜it of all firms
in the same 4-digit NACE industry and the same country (“Co-Ind”)/ the same 4-digit NACE
industry(“Ind”)/the same country(“Co”) and the parent firm’s total asset stock.
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Table 6: Robustness Tests, Fixed–Effects, Panel 1995–2005
Dependent Variable: Log Profit Before Tax
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log Parent Profit × Low-tax Subs .0342∗∗ .0447∗∗∗ .0563∗∗∗
(.0161) (.0146) (.0180)
Log Parent Profit .0405 −.0181 −.0248
(.0323) (.0137) (.0172)
Log Parent Profit×Financial Depth −.0617
(.0413)
Log Group Profit .0208∗∗ .0099
(.0104) (.0125)
Log Total Assets .6987∗∗∗ .7215∗∗∗ .6629∗∗∗ .7188∗∗∗ .6970∗∗∗
(.0323) (.0442) (.0530) (.0377) (.0507)
Year Dummies
√ √ √ √ √
Industry-Year Dummies
√ √ √ √ √
Country-Pair-Year Dummies
√ √ √ √ √
Sample All FD> 0.5 FD> 0.65 All All
Observations 17, 095 14, 101 8, 758 16, 318 13, 036
Number of Firms 4, 685 3, 640 2, 236 4, 173 3, 343
R Squared Within 0.2832 0.2670 0.2538 0.3016 0.3147
Notes: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for firm clusters in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗
indicates significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are multinational subsidiaries
with a foreign parent firm. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the subsidiary’s pre–tax profit.
The variable Log Parent Profit in specifications (1) to (3) depicts the logarithm of the parent firm’s
pre-shifting profit as constructed in Section 4 (using firms in the same country and the same 4-digit
NACE industry for construction). Analogously, Log Group Profit depicts the logarithm of the sum of
pre-shifting profits at all group affiliates with a higher (lower) corporate tax rate than the considered
affiliate in specification 4 (specification 5). Low-tax Subs is a dummy variable that takes on the value
1 if the subsidiary exhibits a lower statutory corporate tax rate than the parent firm. Log Total
Assets is the logarithm of the subsidiary’s total asset stock. Financial depth (abbreviated “FD”)
depicts the ratio of financial system deposits to GDP as a proxy for financial development which
is obtained from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2000) and Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2009).
Year Dummies (Industry-Year Dummies) indicate a full set of year fixed effects (industry-year fixed
effects at the 2-digit NACE level). Country-Year Dummies depict a full set of country-year fixed
effects for the subsidiary country. Country-Pair-Year Dummies depict country-pair-year fixed effects
for the subsidiary and the parent country.
FZID Discussion Papers 
 
Competence Centers: 
 
IK:   Innovation and Knowledge 
ICT:   Information Systems and Communication Systems 
CRFM:   Corporate Finance and Risk Management 
HCM:   Health Care Management 
CM:   Communication Management 
MM:   Marketing Management 
ECO:   Economics 
SE:   Sustainability and Ethics 
 
Download FZID Discussion Papers from our homepage: https://fzid.uni-hohenheim.de/71978.html 
 
 
 
 
Nr. Autor Titel CC
 
01-2009 
 
Julian P. Christ 
 
NEW ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY RELOADED: 
Localized Knowledge Spillovers and the Geography of Innovation 
 
 
IK
02-2009 André P. Slowak MARKET FIELD STRUCTURE & DYNAMICS IN INDUSTRIAL 
AUTOMATION 
 
IK
03-2009 Pier Paolo Saviotti 
and Andreas Pyka 
 
GENERALIZED BARRIERS TO ENTRY AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 
IK
04-2009 Uwe Focht, Andreas 
Richter, and Jörg 
Schiller 
 
INTERMEDIATION AND MATCHING IN INSURANCE MARKETS HCM
05-2009 Julian P. Christ and 
André P. Slowak 
 
WHY BLU-RAY VS. HD-DVD IS NOT VHS VS. BETAMAX: 
THE CO-EVOLUTION OF STANDARD-SETTING CONSORTIA 
IK
06-2009 Gabriel Felbermayr, 
Mario Larch, and 
Wolfgang Lechthaler 
 
UNEMPLOYMENT IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD ECO
07-2009 Steffen Otterbach MISMATCHES BETWEEN ACTUAL AND PREFERRED WORK 
TIME: Empirical Evidence of Hours Constraints in 21 Countries 
 
HCM
08-2009 Sven Wydra  PRODUCTION AND EMPLOYMENT IMPACTS OF NEW 
TECHNOLOGIES – ANALYSIS FOR BIOTECHNOLOGY 
 
IK 
09-2009 Ralf Richter and  
Jochen Streb 
CATCHING-UP AND FALLING BEHIND 
KNOWLEDGE SPILLOVER FROM AMERICAN 
TO GERMAN MACHINE TOOL MAKERS 
IK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nr. Autor Titel CC
 
10-2010 
 
Rahel Aichele and 
Gabriel Felbermayr 
 
 
KYOTO AND THE CARBON CONTENT OF TRADE 
 
ECO
11-2010 David E. Bloom and 
Alfonso Sousa-Poza 
 
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF LOW FERTILITY IN EUROPE 
 
HCM
12-2010 Michael Ahlheim and 
Oliver Frör 
DRINKING AND PROTECTING – A MARKET APPROACH TO THE 
PRESERVATION OF CORK OAK LANDSCAPES 
 
 
ECO
13-2010 Michael Ahlheim, 
Oliver Frör,  
Antonia Heinke, 
Nguyen Minh Duc, 
and Pham Van Dinh 
 
LABOUR AS A UTILITY MEASURE IN CONTINGENT VALUATION 
STUDIES – HOW GOOD IS IT REALLY? 
ECO
14-2010 Julian P. Christ  THE GEOGRAPHY AND CO-LOCATION OF EUROPEAN 
TECHNOLOGY-SPECIFIC CO-INVENTORSHIP NETWORKS 
 
IK
15-2010 Harald Degner WINDOWS OF TECHNOLOGICAL OPPORTUNITY 
DO TECHNOLOGICAL BOOMS INFLUENCE THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN FIRM SIZE AND INNOVATIVENESS? 
 
IK
16-2010 Tobias A. Jopp THE WELFARE STATE EVOLVES:  
GERMAN KNAPPSCHAFTEN, 1854-1923 
 
HCM
17-2010 Stefan Kirn (Ed.) PROCESS OF CHANGE IN ORGANISATIONS THROUGH 
eHEALTH 
 
ICT
18-2010 Jörg Schiller ÖKONOMISCHE ASPEKTE DER ENTLOHNUNG  
UND REGULIERUNG UNABHÄNGIGER 
VERSICHERUNGSVERMITTLER  
 
HCM
19-2010 Frauke Lammers and 
Jörg Schiller  
CONTRACT DESIGN AND INSURANCE FRAUD: AN 
EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION  
 
HCM
20-2010 Martyna Marczak and 
Thomas Beissinger 
 
REAL WAGES AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE IN GERMANY 
 
ECO
21-2010 Harald Degner and 
Jochen Streb 
 
FOREIGN PATENTING IN GERMANY, 1877-1932 
 
IK
22-2010 Heiko Stüber and 
Thomas Beissinger 
DOES DOWNWARD NOMINAL WAGE RIGIDITY 
DAMPEN WAGE INCREASES? 
 
ECO
23-2010 Mark Spoerer and 
Thomas Beissinger 
GUNS AND BUTTER – BUT NO MARGARINE: THE IMPACT OF 
NAZI ECONOMIC POLICIES ON GERMAN FOOD 
CONSUMPTION, 1933-38 
 
ECO
24-2011 Dhammika 
Dharmapala and 
Nadine Riedel 
EARNINGS SHOCKS AND TAX-MOTIVATED INCOME-SHIFTING: 
EVIDENCE FROM EUROPEAN MULTINATIONALS 
ECO
 
U n i v e r s i t ä t  H o h e n h e i m
F o r s c h u n g s z e n t r u m 
Innovation und Dienstleistung
Fruwirthstr. 12
D-70593 Stuttgart
Phone  +49 (0)711 / 459-22476 
Fax  +49 (0)711 / 459-23360
Internet  www.fzid.uni-hohenheim.de
